Louisiana Law Review
Volume 30 | Number 4
June 1970

Duty of Insurer to Settle
Katherine L. Shaw

Repository Citation
Katherine L. Shaw, Duty of Insurer to Settle, 30 La. L. Rev. (1970)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol30/iss4/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 30

This construction is supported by Code of Civil Procedure
article 3007, which provides that succession creditors may demand security when an intestate's heirs, or the heirs and the
surviving spouse, have been sent into possession of the property
of the intestate, which includes only half of the former community over which the survivor has a usufruct. Code of Civil
Procedure article 3008 provides that when security pursuant to
article 3007 is not given, the court, on an ex parte motion of the
creditors, may order an administration of the succession, and
the parties sent into possession must surrender to the administrator all of the property of the deceased, which they have
received, which in the case of the survivor will only be the
deceased's half interest over which he has a usufruct. It is
submitted that these articles are not authority for allowing any
administration of the survivor's half-interest in the former
community; nor do they require the survivor to give security
for his share. This construction gives the fullest effect to all
of these articles; and it is consistent with Civil Code articles
584 and 585, which indicate that where the usufructuary does
not advance the amount necessary to discharge debts of the
property subject to his usufruct, then so much of the property
as is necessary to pay the debts may be sold.0 1 Likewise, under
articles 3007 and 3008, if the usufructuary does not furnish
security, the property burdened with the usufruct may be
administered with the succession of the deceased.
Since Code of Civil Procedure articles 3001-3008, 3031-3035,
and 3061-3062 only involve possession of undivided interests,
it is suggested that they should not be construed to defeat the
right of the wife or her heirs to sue for a partition. Once the
community has been accepted, the right to a partition is
absolute.
Joseph E. LeBlanc, Jr.

DUTY OF INSURER TO SETTLE
In a society of increasing complexity, insurance has assumed
a role of significant utility. The contract of insurance has
become sophisticated and inclusive in its provisions; thus, interpretation of the contract and determination of its legal con91. See Succession of Bringier, 4 La. Ann. 389 (1849);
Fitzwilliams, 3 La. Ann. 489 (1848).

Succession of
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sequences are of particular interest. By the terms of an automobile liability policy, the insurer, to the exclusion of the
insured,' usually undertakes to defend the insured in a potential
lawsuit and is given control of the preparation and negotiation
involved in the litigation. If a complainant prior to the trial offers
to compromise his claim against the insured for an amount
within the policy limits, the insurer has the option to either
accept or reject the offer. If the insurer chooses to reject the
offer and a subsequent judgment is rendered against the insured
in excess of the policy limits, it must be determined what
recourse, if any, the insured has against the insurer.
Duty to Defend
By the terms of the usual insurance policy the insurer is
obligated to defend a suit against the insured even if it is
1. Aetna Casualty and Surety Company Family Automobile Policy
(Custom-Rite): "[The Company promises to] pay on behalf of the Insured
all sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages . . . and the Company shall defend any suit . . . even if . . .
groundless, false or fraudulent; but the Company may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient.
"The Insured shall cooperate with the Company and, upon the Company's request, assist in making settlement. . . . The Insured shall not,
except at its own cost, voluntarily make any payment, assume any obligation or incur any expense other than for such . . . as shall be imperative
at the time of the accident." Cited in Comment, 43 WASH. L. REV. 799 n.1
(1968).
Another sample of an ordinary insurance policy is found In E. SAWYER,
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE 73-74 (1936): "It is further agreed that as
respects insurance afforded by this policy the company shall
"(a) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the insured alleging
such injury or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even
if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company shall have
the right to make such investigation, negotiation and settlement of any
claim or suit as may be deemed expedient by the company
"(b) pay all premiums on bonds to release attachments for an amount
not in excess of the applicable limit of liability of this policy, all premiums
on appeal bonds required in any such defended suit, but without any
obligation to apply for or furnish such bonds, all costs taxed against
the insured in any such suit, all expenses incurred by the company, all
interest accruing after entry of judgment until the company has paid,
tendered or deposited in the court such part of such judgment as does
not exceed the limit of the company's liability thereon, and any expense
incurred by the insured, in the event of bodily injury, for such immediate
medical and surgical relief to others as shall be imperative at the time of
the accident.
"The company agrees to pay the expenses incurred under divisions (a)
and (b) of this section in addition to the applicable limit of liability of this
policy."
There is an additional problem as to whether the insured may retain
an attorney himself and then compromise the claim with the injured party;
this specific problem is not dealt with in this Comment.
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"groundless, false, or fraudulent. '2 The rule in most American
jurisdictions, including Louisiana, is that the duty of the insurer
to defend an action against the insured is measured by whether
the allegations in the injured party's complaint constitute a
claim within the scope of the insurance policy, 8 regardless of
2. See generally 43 AM. JUR.2d Insurance §§ 1535-1559 (1969). Also,
the duty of the insurer to defend its insured is discussed in Note, 5
WILLAMETTE L.J. 321 (1969). Additional law review articles dealing with the
insurer's duty to defend include: Cahoon, Company's Duty To Defend, 1961
INS. L.J. 151; Note, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 487 (1949); Note, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1436
(1955); Note, 41 IND. L.J. 87 (1965); Note, 31 N.D. L. REv. 67 (1955); Note,

16 OHIO ST. L.J. 276 (1955); Comment, 34 TEMP. L.Q. 152 (1961).
3. Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1965); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. City of Poplar Bluff, 261 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Mo. 1966);
Baker v. American Ins. Co. of Newark, 212 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. S.C. 1963);
Mason v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal.App.2d 603, 29 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1963);
Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ivy Liquors, Inc., 185 So.2d 187 (Fla. App.
3d Dist. 1966); 5 G. COUCH, INSURANCE
OF INSURANCE § 421 (5th ed. 1952).

§ 1175e (1929); 3 G. RICHARDS, LAW

According to Appleman, "an insurer's duty to defend an action against
the insured is measured in the first instance by the allegations in the
plaintiff's pleadings, and if such pleadings state facts bringing the injury
within the coverage of the policy, the insurer must defend, irrespective
of the insured's ultimate liability to the plaintiff." 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4683 (1962).

Most jurisdictions hold that if the alleged facts are within the policy
coverage, the duty to defend exists. Blackfield v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
London, 245 Cal.App.2d 271, 53 Cal.Rptr. 838 (1966); Stein v. Lindquist,
69 Ill.App.2d 340, 217 N.E.2d 438 (1966); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. North
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 358, 152 S.E.2d 513 (1967);
International Service Ins. Co. v. Boll, 392 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
See generally Note, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1019 (1955); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REV.
445 (1954).
A somewhat anomalous situation arises when although the complaint
fails to aver facts which are Included within the policy coverage, the insurer
knows that the actual facts are within the coverage. When such situations
have confronted the judiciary, there has been an inconsistent disposal of
such cases-either no duty of the insurer if the facts do not appear in the
complaint (Brenner v. McCullough, 216 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal.App.2d 603, 29 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1963);
Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962);
Benoit v. Fuselier, 195 So.2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Employers' Fire
Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397 (R.I. 1968)); or a duty of the Insurer when
there are facts not In the complaint giving rise to a potential of liability
under the policy. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 199 F.
Supp. 769 (N.D. Ill. 1961); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal.Rptr.
104 (1966); Sims v. Illinois Nat'l Cas. Co., 43 Ill.App.2d 184, 193 N.E.2d 123
(1963); Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v. Beals, 240 A.2d 397 (R.I. 1968). A complaint being determinative of the insurer's duty to defend was justified
under older methods of pleading requiring specific theories to be pleaded
[J. GOULD, PRINCIPLES OF PLEADING IN CIVIL ACTIONS (3d ed. 1849); J. MCKELVEY,

PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW PLEADING

(2d ed. 1917)1;

yet today with the

advent of notice pleading there seems to be little justification (Journal
Pub. Co. v. General Cas. Co., 210 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1954)), but that the
insurer has a definite basis on which he may determine his duty to defend.
Comment, 65 W. VA. L. REV. 175 (1963). Increasingly, courts have expressed
concern for the diminishing bargaining position of the individual In a
highly organized and integrated society and that the contract must be
interpreted to satisfy the reasonable expectations of the insured. R. POUND,

1970]

COMMENTS

insured's ultimate liability to the complainant; for the insurance company's duty to defend is independent of the obligation to pay. 4 As a corollary to this proposition, the insurer is
under no duty to defend where the averments do not constitute a claim within the policy's coverage, although the true
facts of the incident from which the claim arises may be within
the scope of the policy's protection. 5 When an insurer refuses
to defend for whatever reason 6 and a subsequent determination
of his duty to defend follows, the insurer is exposed to liability
for the insured's expenses in handling his own defense.7
In Louisiana, as in a majority of jurisdictions, an insurer's
duty to defend is determined by the allegations of the petition. 8
Therefore, if the allegations of the petition allege facts within
an unambiguous exclusionary provision of the policy, the insurer
is justified in refusing to defend the suit against the insured.'
29 (1921); Ehrenzweig, Adhesion Contracts
in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 1072 (1953); Isaacs, The Standardizing Contracts,27 YALE L.J. 34 (1917); Kessler, Contracts of Adheston-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943).
See Note, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1328 (1967).
4. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530
(W.D. La. 1966). See also Note, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1328 (1967).
5. Albuquerque Gravel Prod. Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 282
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1960); Zipperer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 254
F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1958); Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 214 Cal.App.2d 603,
29 Cal.Rptr. 586 (1963); Steel Erection Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392
S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
6. See Note, 28 WASH. L. REv. 239 (1953). An insurer may refuse for
noncoverage reasons. Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694 (1954). Or, an insurer
may refuse to defend on the basis that some grounds of the complaint
fall inside policy coverage and some fall outside the coverage. Annot.,
41 A.L.R.2d 434 (1952).
7. In all cases wherein the Insurer has been held liable for a wrongful
refusal to defend it has been held liable to the insured for all costs, the
amount of the policy, and reasonable attorney's fees. Phoenix Indem. Co. v.
Anderson's Groves, Inc., 176 F.2d 246 (5th Cir. 1949). See Note, 3 U. FA.
L. REV. 247 (1950); Comment, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 124 (1959).
8. Parks Equip. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1206, 1212 (E.D.
La. 1968); Fuselier v. Continental Cas. Co., 195 So.2d 679 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1967); Rancatore v. Evans, 182 So.2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966); Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Gallo, 170 So.2d 721 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964); Smith v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 161 So.2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964);
Kamm v. Morgan, 157 So.2d 118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963); C. A. Collins &
Son v. Pope Bros. Steam Cleaning Co., 155 So.2d 278 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963); Foreman v. Jordan, 131 So.2d 796 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961); Superior
Cleaners v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 116 So.2d 195 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1959);
Kelly v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 76 So.2d 116 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1954); Lang v. Jersey Gold Creameries, 172 So. 389 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
The Smith case supra is discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate
Courts for the 1963-1964 Term-Insurance, 25 LA. L. REV. 381 (1965).
9. Mitchell v. Jefferson Water Works, 210 So.2d 146 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1968); Aladdin Oil Co. v. Rayburn Well Service, Inc., 202 So.2d 477 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967); Brady v. American Ins. Co., 198 So. 2d 907 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967); Rancatore v. Evans, 182 So.2d 102 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966);
THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
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However, if the insurer unjustifiably refuses to defend the
insured and so breaches his contract, he is liable to the insured
for the amount of the policy, plus reasonable attorney's fees'0
and costs1' expended by the insured in his defense.
Duty to Settle
Early decisions indicated that the insurer was under no
duty to settle, and that there was consequently no liability
for a failure to accept a compromise. 2 The rationale of these
decisions was based upon the fact that the insurance contract
phrased the obligation to settle in discretionary terms; thus,
when an insurer rejected a settlement offer, he was only doing
what he had an absolute right to do.
In New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,13
a 1905 decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court employed this
language:
"Parties must be held bound as they choose to bind themselves. Negotiation and settlement of suits were left to the
insurer. The insurer has the right to decide upon the advisability of resisting the payment of a claim in suit and the
Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Gallo, 170 So.2d 721 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1964); Smith v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 161 So.2d 903 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964);
C. A. Collins & Son v. Pope Bros. Steam Cleaning Co., 155 So.2d 278 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963); Foreman v. Jordan, 131 So.2d 796 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1961); Superior Cleaners v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 116 So.2d 195 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1959); Kelly v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co,. 76 So.2d 116
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1954); Lang v. Jersey Gold Creameries, 172 So. 389 (La.
App.
2d Cir. 1937).
. However,
if the facts of the petition are within coverage, the insured
may force the Insurer to defend by calling it in warranty. Sherman v.
O'Sullivan, 164 So. 343 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1935).
10. The insurer's liability for attorney's fees for a refusal to defend
are established by jurisprudential decisions. See note 11 infra.
11. Parks Equip. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 293 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D.
La. 1968); S. R. Zagst & Co. v. Southern Sur. Co., 148 La. 328, 86 So. 828
(1921); Bourgeois v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 222 So.2d 70 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1969); Aladdin Oil Co. v. Rayburn Well Service, Inc., 202 So.2d 477 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1967); Smith v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 161 So.2d 903 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1964); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Marquette Cas. Co., 143 So.2d 249
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Kansas v. Sun Indem. Co. of N.Y., 37 So.2d 621
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1948); Standard Sur. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Perrin, 19
So.2d 783 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944); Bordelon v. Ludeau's Lumber Yard, 177
So. 436 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1937); Lang v. Jersey Gold Creameries, 172 So.
389 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937); Shehee-Ford Wagon & Harness Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 170 So. 249 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1936); Sears v. Interurban
Transp. Co., 14 La. App. 343, 125 So. 748 (2d Cir. 1930).
12. Prickett v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1960);
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fields, 106 Ga. App. 740, 128 S.E.2d 358
(1962); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
13. 114 La. 153, 38 So. 89 (1905).
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plaintiff appears to have consented not to interfere. It
reserved the right absolutely not to be interfered with in
the settlement of suits.' u 4 (Emphasis added.)

Although there were probably at least two overriding considerations in its decision,15 the court clearly recognized no duty on
the insurer to settle claims against the insured under the
contract. Approximately twenty-five years later in Davis v.
Maryland Cas. Co.,'( the insurer refused an offer to compromise
within the policy limits both prior to and subsequent to the
trial. The court once again found the insurer not liable for the
excess judgment rendered against the insured. The court concluded that in the absence of bad faith the insurer's action in
exercising its legal right not to settle had left it free from
liability for an excess of judgment. 17 Thus, Louisiana jurisprudence was in accord with the decisions of other jurisdictions
in finding no duty on the insurer to settle claims.
This early position presupposed equality of bargaining
power and freedom of contract. A literal interpretation of the
modern insurance contract imposes no duty upon the insurer
to settle. During the infancy of the insurance industry such a
position was probably justified; an insured could possibly negotiate to some extent the terms and conditions of his policy.
Furthermore, a laissez-faire approach to the conduct of business rejected interference by the judiciary with the freedom to
contract. Because, however, of the advent of highly standardized
contracts and widespread adoption of compulsory insurance, the
problem could no longer be solved by a literal interpretation
of the insurance contract. Conflict of interests existed as the
insurer wished to reduce its liability within the policy limits
and the insured cared only to settle for an amount not to exceed
the policy limits. Thus, the problem presented was how the law
could effectively readjust the rights of the parties.' 8
14. Id.

at 159, 38 So. at 91.

15. The amount of excess awarded over the policy limits was a minimal
$500. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 114 La. 153,
38 So. 89 (1905).
16. 16 La. App. 253, 133 So. 769 (2d Cir. 1931).
17. Id. at 259, 133 So. at 771.
18. Naturally, the attorney representing both the insured and the
insurer is posed with a difficult problem in considering the conflicting
interests of both. He must perform so as to serve the interests of both
of his clients. Canon 6 of the Canon of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association provides: "It is unprofessional to represent conflicting
interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
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Contract or Tort
A majority of jurisdictions now consider a failure to settle
as giving rise to a cause of action in tort.19 Under a tort theory,
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it Is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose."
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 103 (1953).
Throughout Drinker's book he speaks of conflicting interests in terms
of representing clients opposed to one another in the same litigation.
However, when an attorney assumes Initially to defend both the insurer and
insured, their interests do not conflict as they both seek to recover against
a tortfeasor or successfully defend against one. But, when a settlement is
offered within the policy limits, the insurer's and insured's interests diverge:
"When the interests of clients diverge and become antagonistic, their
lawyer must be absolutely impartial between them. . . ." Id. at 112. Thus,
ethically once the interests of the insurer and insured diverge with a
compromise proposal within the policy limits the Insurer is under a duty
to act impartially considering the interests of the lawyer equally with
those of the insurer.
Because of the frequency with which problems of conflicting interests
arise in connection with insurance contracts, there has been a justification
for the practice of a policy provision requiring the insurer's attorney to
defend the insured-the justification being advance consent on the part
of the insured obviating an improper conflict of interest. Id. at 114. See also
ABA Opinion 282 (1950).
Recently, the Code of Professional Responsibility was enacted and
became effective January 1, 1970; it was primarily enacted to revise the
Code of Professional Ethics. Under Canon 5-a lawyer should exercise
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client-the problem of
representing conflicting interests is discussed: "Typically recurring situations involving potentially differing interests are those in wihch a lawyer
is asked to represent ... an insured and his insurer.... Whether a lawyer
can fairly and adequately protect the interests of multiple clients in these
and similar situations depends upon an analysis of each case."
In American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialites, 205
Misc. 1066, 1075, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 401 (1954), the court summarized the
attorney's duty as the following: "When counsel, although paid by the
casualty company, undertakes to represent the policyholder and files his
notice of appearance, he owes to his client, the assured, an undeviating
and single allegiance."
Thus, it seems that the propriety of representing two clients with
conflicting interests actually is determined by each case. But, the attorney
should be aware of the circumstance and remain Impartial in considering
the two interests of his clients. The clients should be informed of the
implications of the common representation; and if the interests of the
clients become conflicting, the lawyer should provide the clients or client
(usually, in the insurer-insured situation, the insured) the opportunity to
obtain independent counsel. See Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility
(1969).
19. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Gault, 196 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1952); Auerbach v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923); Southern Fire & Cas.
Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952). See generally 43
Am. JuR. 2d Insurance § 1530-1534 (1969); Notes, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783
(1959), 22 TENN. L. REv. 965 (1593); Comments, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1966),
38 TEx. L. REv. 233 (1959).
Other jurisdictions classify the relationship of the insurer to the
insured as that of an independent contractor. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917); Foremost Dairies v. Camp-
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liability flows from the wrongful conduct of the insurer and
not from any duty arising from the terms of the contract. The
policy of insurance is said to create a fiduciary relationship
between the insurer and insured, 20 each owing the other the
duty of good faith in exercising the privileges and discharging
the duties specified in the policy.21 Because of the existence of
this relationship, the insurer has the duty to consider the
interest of its insured equally with its own, and a breach of
22
this duty results in tort liability.
Other courts have held that the contract of insurance con28
tains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
24
which the insurer might breach in failing to settle a claim.
"There is an implied covenant that neither party shall do
anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring
bell Coal Co., 57 Ga. App. 500, 196 S.E. 279 (1938); Note, 3 VAND. L. REV. 329
(1950).
For a discussion of the kinds of relationships created by the insurance
contract, see Notes, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 511 (1934), 31 ILL. L. REV. 116 (1936);
8 MINN. L. REV. 151 (1924), 1 Mo. L. REV. 198 (1936), 15 N.C. L. REV. 422
(1937).
20. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F.2d 21 (6th Cir.
1960); Ballard v. Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Fetter Livestock Co. v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 257 F. Supp. 4
(D. Mont. 1966); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 319
P.2d 69 (1957); Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 235 N.W. 413
(1931).
Louisiana also considers the insurer a fiduciary. Wilks v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 195 So.2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967). 7A J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 4711 (1962): "It is not sufficient for the Insurer to consult
its own self-interest. As a professional in the defense of suits, it must
use a degree of skill commensurate with such professional standards.
As the champion of the insured, it must consider as paramount his interests,
rather than its own, and may not gamble with his funds. Its relationship
is somewhat of a fiduciary one, and the liability is greater than indicated
by some of its earlier holdings. Thus, if the insurer refuses to settle a
claim because it believes that the Insured is not liable, it Is nevertheless
answerable for such refusal if its belief was arbitrary and capricious."
See generally Sackville, The Duty of the Insurer To Settle Within the Policy
Limit-A Case of the Standard Contract of Adhesion, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 72;
Notes, 1950 INS. L.J. 642, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783 (1959), 3 VAND. L. REV. 329
(1950).
21. Note, 22 TENN. L. REV. 965 (1953).
22. Note, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783 (1959); Comment, 6 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 124
(1959).
23. Sackville, The Duty of an Insurer To Settle Within the Policy LimitA Case of the Standard Contract of Adhesion, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 72.
24. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426
P.2d 173 (1967); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 116 Cal.App.2d 198,
253 P.2d 495 (1953); Dumas v. Hartford Ace. & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484,
56 A.2d 57 (1947). Note, 57 MICH. L. REV. 775 (1959); Comment, 38 TEx. L.
REv. 233 (1959); Sackville, The Duty of the Insurer to Settle Within the
Policy Limit-A Case of the Standard Contract of Adhesion, 1968 UTAH L.
REV. 72.
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the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the
contract, in other words, in every contract, there exists an
25
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."
A minority of jurisdictions stress that the rights of the
parties should be determined by their agreement and that any
obligation of the insurer to settle should arise from the contract. 26
Louisiana courts in disposition of claims against an insurer
by an insured for a refusal to settle have rarely discussed the
nature of the duty imposed on the insurer by his contract.
Those that have discussed it find the duty of the insurer to settle
arising in contract.27 In Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas.
Co., 2s the First Circuit Court of Appeal took a unique approach,

finding a contractual duty. to settle included in the obligation

to defend any suit, 29 a breach of which results by failing to

inform the insured of an offer of settlement. Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co. 80 held that although breach of a contractual obligation may give rise to actions both in contract
and in tort,8' 1 the insured had pleaded a breach of contract and
25. 3 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 670, at 1926 (rev. ed. 1936). However,
one writer points out that an implied covenant of good faith does not apply
to conduct of one, upon whom, by contract, a right has been conferred.

Note, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783 (1959).
26. Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923);
C. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co. v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 244 Pa. 286, 90 A.
653 (1914). See Epps & Chappell, Insurer's Liability in Excess of the Policy
Limits, 44 VA. L. REV. 267 (1958).

27. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 619 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1966), aff'd, 250 La. 105, 194 So.2d 713 (1967); Wooten v. Central
Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). The Wooten case Is
discussed in The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1965-1966
Term-Insurance, 26 LA. L. REV. 566, 568 (1967).
28. 185 So.2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
29. ". . . [tihe insurer . . . had the right to make such settlement
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient, and conversely, the right not
to make settlement as it deems expedient. However, the exercise of this
right is not plenary. It is qualified to the extent it must be used in manner
reasonable, not arbitrary." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 625.
30. 166 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
31. Breach of a contract may well give rise to actions both "ex contractu"
and "ex delicto." Damages "ex contractu" flow from breach of a special
obligation contractually assumed by the obligor; damages "ex delicto"
flow from violation of a general duty owed to all persons. State v. Fourchy,
106 La. 743, 31 So. 325 (1901); City of New Orleans v. The Southern Bank,
31 La. Ann. 560 (1879); Kohn v. Mayor of Carrollton, 10 La. Ann. 719 (1855);
25 C.J.S. Damages § 2 (1955). See also Reserve Ins. Co. v. Fabre, 243 La.
982, 149 So.2d 413 (1963); P. Olivier & Sons v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 La.
802, 160 So. 419 (1935); Davis v. LeBlanc, 149 So.2d 252 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1963); Hunter v. Mayfield, 106 So.2d 330 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958);
Parro v. Fifteen Oil Co., 26 So.2d 30 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); 2 PLANIOL,
CIVIL LAW TREATISE no. 873 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
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the question whether the same conduct constituted a tort was
immaterial to disposition of the case. 32 In holding the insurer

liable to the insured for the excess judgment, the court acknowledged the existence of an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in the settlement of claims,83 a breach of which
resulted in the insurer's liability.8 4 Under prevailing Louisiana
jurisprudence the effect of the pronouncement that a breach of
the duty to settle may give rise to an action in tort or contract
allows an insured the option of choosing either theories.8 5 The
nature of the duty of the insurer is of some significance in
determining (1) the period of prescription applicable to the
action,8 6 (2) the amount of damages recoverable, 7 and (3) the
32. Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747, 751 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1964).
33. Id. The decision seems sound and there is some basis for the
conclusion under Louisiana law. LA. CIv. CODE: art. 1901:
"Agreements legally entered into have the effect of laws on those who
have formed them.
"They can not be revoked, unless by mutual consent of the parties,
or for causes acknowledged by law.
"They must be performed in good faith." (Emphasis added.)
34. Despite the pronouncements of both appellate courts, there is no
authoritative decision as to whether the nature of the duty is contractual
or delictual as the Supreme Court has never specifically ruled on the
question.
35. Lafleur v. Brown, 223 La. 976, 67 So.2d 556 (1953); Kramer v.
Freeman, 198 La. 244, 3 So.2d 609 (1941); American Heating & Plumbing
Co. v. West End Country Club, 171 La. 482, 131 So. 466 (1930).
36. Under the Louisiana Civil Code, actions for breach of contract are
prescribed by ten years (article 3544); whereas, actions for damages resulting from "offenses or quasi offenses" prescribe in one year (article 3536).
37. Damages recoverable for breach of contract are governed by article
1934 of the Louisiana Civil Code and are limited to the amount of loss that
the plaintiff has sustained and the profit of which he has been deprived.
Furthermore, if the defendant (which in this case would be the insurer)
has not been guilty of fraud or bad faith, the amount of damages are
limited to those contemplated by the parties at the time of entering the
contract. If the defendant was in bad faith, damages recoverable are
those which are the immediate and direct consequence of the breach. Bad
faith damages would include attorney's fees and the court has never
awarded the fees to an insured suing an insurer for breach of its duty to
settle. Therefore, it may be surmised that thus far damages have been
limited to those "contemplated by the parties" which amount substantially
to the excess judgment awarded against the insured above the policy
limits.
On the other hand, damages resulting from an offense are not so
limited by the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 2315 states that "every act
whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose
fault it happened to repair it." Thus, a tort basis for recovery against the
Insurer would allow recovery of consequential damages. An example of
the extent to which damages may be recoverable for an action in tort
against the insurer is Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d
173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967), wherein the insured was awarded the amount
of the excess judgment plus an award for mental suffering amounting to
$25,000-due to the change in her financial condition accompanied by a
decline in physical health, hysteria and a suicide attempt.
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possibility of assignment by the insured of his action against
the insurer. 88
Rather than look to the general law of tort or of contract,
8
Louisiana might utilize its Civil Code provisions of mandate. '
The insurance contract, whereby the insured agrees to relinquish
the control of a possible lawsuit to the insurer, is analogous to
a mandate given by one person to another "to transact for him
and in his name, one or several affairs. '40 (Emphasis added.) A
mandate may be given by an agreement under private signa42
Specifically, an
ture,41 and it may be general or special.
mandate
a
special
of
insurer's duty to settle is in the nature
(for the one affair only) with an indefinite power "to do what48
ever may appear conducive to the interest of the principal.
The Code even contemplates the situation in which a power
may be conferred to compromise or "to make a transaction in
matters of litigation .... -44 on behalf of the principal. Furthermore, article 3003 provides:
"The attorney [mandatary] is responsible, not only for
unfaithfulness in his management, but also for his fault
and neglect. Nevertheless, the responsibility with respect
to faults, is enforced less vigorously against the mandatary
acting gratuitously, than against him who receives a
reward."45
Since mandate is a special type of contract governed by its
own provisions in the Civil Code, general principles of contract
38. See note 151 infra. Tort actions are usually considered nonassignable, whereas assignment is usually allowed for a breach of contract.
39. LA. Civ. CoDH arts. 2985-3034.
40. Id. art. 2985: "A mandate, procuration or letter of attorney Is an
act by which one person gives power to another to transact for him and
in his name, one or several affairs."
41. Id. art. 2992: "A power of attorney may be given, either by a public
act or by a writing under private signature, even by letter."
42. Id. art. 2994: "It may be either general for all affairs, or special
for one affair only."
43. Id. art. 2995: "It may vest an indefinite power to do whatever
may appear conducive to the interest of the principal, or it may restrict
the power given to the doing of what is specified in the procuration."
44. Id. art. 2997: "Thus, the power must be express and special for the
following purposes:
"To compromise or refer a matter to arbitration.
"To make a transaction in matters of litigation. .. .
45. Id. art. 3003. At least one other writer recognized the possibility
of utilizing this particular article to solve Louisiana's problems with the
liability of the Insurer for a wrongful refusal to settle. See Note, 39 TUL.
L. RnV. 368 (1965).
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law would be applicable if not provided for by the articles of
mandate. These general provisions of contract law would include prescription, 46 damages "ex contractu, ' 4 7 and the assignability of an action for breach of contract. 48
Duty of Good Faith
Most courts agree that an insurer is bound to give some
consideration to the insured's interest. There is, however, a
split of authority on the question whether the insurer's obligation is to act with "good faith" in considering an offer of compromise, or whether it is required to exercise "due care." In
a great majority of the cases considering the question, the
courts have found the insurer liable in excess of the policy
limits for failing to exercise "good faith" in considering offers
to compromise a claim within the policy limits. 49 Some courts
in determining liability for failure to exercise "good faith"
expressly reject liability based on negligence, 50 while other
jurisdictions consider negligence as a factor in determining "bad
faith" on the part of the insurer. 51
46. LA. CIV. CoD art. 3544. The prescriptive date for actions for breach
of contract is ten years.
47. Damages recoverable for a breach of contract are governed by id.
art. 1934: "Where the object of the contract is any thing but the payment
of money, the damages due to the creditor for its breach are the amount
of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been
deprived. .. ."
48. Generally, a right for breach of contract is assignable. See notes
150, 151 infra.
49. Potomac Ins. Co. v. Wilkins Co., 376 F.2d 425 (10th Cir. 1967);
Abernethy v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 373 F.2d 565 (4th Cir. 1967); Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 370 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1966); Noshey v. American
Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1932); Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 278 F. Supp. 405 (E.D. Tenn. 1967); Jessen v. O'Dantel, 210 F. Supp.
317 (D. Mont. 1962); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679,
319 P.2d 69 (1958); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777
(1932).
Of particular interest are the decisions of the Fifth Circuit, United
States Court of Appeals. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475
(5th Cir. 1969); Seward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 392 F.2d 723
(5th Cir. 1968); Hendry v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 372 F.2d 222 (5th Cir.
1967); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.
1958); Dotschay v. National Ins. Co., 246 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1957); Springer
v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957).
50. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 232 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.
1956); Brockstein v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 266 F. Supp. 223 (E.D.
N.Y. 1967); Georgia Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932);
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prod. Co., 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931).
51. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th
Cir. 1958); Gaskill v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 66 (D. Md.
1966); Davy v. Public Nat'l Ins. Co., 181 Cal. App.2d 387, 5 Cal. Rptr. 488
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As to application of a formulated rule of "good faith," some
courts have indicated that the insurer is entitled to regard his
own interests as paramount; 12 others, that the insured's interest
must be given equal consideration; 5 while at least one court
has said that in the event of a conflict of interests the insured's
5' 4
interest must be given priority.
To determine what constitutes bad faith of the insurer in
rejecting a compromise offer, the facts leading toward the
insurer's liability are his
1. failure to settle where liability of the insured is highly
probable and evidence points to a clear case of liability; 55
2. inadequate investigation of the claim making it impossible to intelligently assess the facts, the circumstances,
and their ramifications;56
3. failure to settle where evident that a judgment would
probably exceed policy limits because of the seriousness
57
of the injuries and amount of damages claimed;
4. express rejection of suggestions of settlement by his
attorney and agent before trial;58
(1960); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 97 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1959);
Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785 (1952);
Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
52. Tennessee Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 277 F.2d 21 (6th Cir.
1960); Hazelrigg v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 241 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1957);
Johnson v. Hardware Mut. Cas. Co., 108 Vt. 269, 187 A. 788 (1936).
53. Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
1965); Springer v. Citizens Cas. Co., 246 F.2d 123 (5th Cir. 1957); Kinder v.
Western Pioneer Ins. Co., 231 Cal. App.2d 894, 42 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1965);
Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d 785
(1952); Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930).
54. Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E.
346 (1933).
55. General Cas. Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353 (7th Cir. 1964); Ballard v.
Citizens Cas. Co., 196 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1952); Noshey v. American Auto.
Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934); Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
184 F. Supp. 634 (D. Md. 1960); Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250
Iowa 1123, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959).
56. American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 708 (5th
Cir. 1958); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446 (5th Cir.
1932); Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D. N.J. 1967); Jessen
v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962); Martin v. Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App.2d 178, 39 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1964); Kohlstedt v.
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 337, 139 N.W.2d 184 (1965).
57. See note 55 supra.
58. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1934);
Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D. N.J. 1967); Brown v.
Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App.2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1958); Henke v. Iowa
Home Mut. Cas. Co., 250 Iowa 337, 97 N.W.2d 168 (1959).
Some weight should be given to the fact that a compromise offer was
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5. non-disclosure of relevant facts to the insured, such as
settlement offers made, or the possibility if excess liability
resulting from a compromise rejection; 59 and
6. sacrifice of a sizable amount of the insured's money to
salvage a small amount of his own.00
On the other hand, factors pointing to a finding of non-liability
include: (1) the presence of distinctly litigable issues as to
liability and the amount of damages;61 (2) reasonable prospects
for non-liability due to exclusionary provisions; 2 (3) active
concurrence by the insured in rejection of a compromise offer 68
or actions by the insured which induce rejection of an offer of
settlement; 4 (4) mere errors in judgment on the part of the
insurer.6 5
In accord with the majority of jurisdictions, Louisiana
decisions generally state that the insurer owes the insured a
duty of "good faith." As early as 1931, Louisiana courts, although
using the language of no duty of the insurer to settle, held
rejected after the trial for the insurer has been unsuccessful and there
is less possibility of a reasonable belief to escape liability. In some cases,
rejection of an offer after the trial has been evidence of bad faith. Foundation Reserve Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 388 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1968); Fidelity &
Guar. Co. v. Evans, 223 Ga. 789, 158 S.E.2d, 243 (1967); Bowers v. Camden
Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 N.J. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968).
Frequently, an insurer charged with a wrongful rejection of a compromise offer has sought to escape liability on the ground that he had
turned the conduct of the defense over to a competent attorney. Such
attempts have usually been unsuccessful. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort
Marine, Accident & P. G. Ins. Co., 240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917).
59. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. O'Daniel, 329 F.2d
60 (9th Cir. 1964); American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d
709 (5th Cir. 1958); Home Indem. Co. v. Williamson, 183 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.
1950); Kaudern v. Allstate Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 83 (D. NJ. 1967); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, 236 A.2d 269 (1967). But cf.
Strode v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 102 F. Supp. 240 (D. Ky. 1952); aff1d,
202 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1953), with Norwood v. Travelers Ins. Co, 204 Minn.
595, 284 N.W. 785 (1939).
60. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Douglas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 81 N.H. 371, 127 A. 708
(1924).
61. American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951); White v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 91 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ga. 1950).
62. Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Stewart Dry Goods Co., 208 Ky. 429, 271 S.W.
444 (1925); Auerbach v. Maryland Cas. Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
63. Royal Transit Inc. v. Central Sur. & Ins. Corp., 168 F.2d 345 (7th
Cir. 1948).
64. Hall v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 204 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1953);
Buffalo v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 84 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1936).
65. American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951); Christian
v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D. Cal. 1950); Georgia
Cas. Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W. 2d 777 (1932). See Comment, 17 U.
MIAMI L. Rrv. 557 (1963).
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that "in the absence of bad faith" there was no liability to
the insured. 68 Almost all of the Louisiana decisions have required
a finding of the breach of an insurer's duty of "good faith. '67
Louisiana's definition of "good faith" includes an obligation
to give equal consideration to the interests of the insured:6 8
"One acts in good faith if he acts honestly and according
to his best judgment, but one acts in bad faith if he uses
his authority to save himself from loss in total disregard
of his insured's rights. In its simplest form, bad faith means
a breach of faith and a willful failure to respond to plain
obligations."0 0
Despite the regularity with which Louisiana courts have applied
the duty of "good faith," later cases indicate a combination of
both "good faith" and "due care" tests to determine the duty
of an insurer to its insured.7 0
Factors found in Louisiana jurisprudence indicative of the
insurer's breach of his duty of "good faith" include: (1) likelihood of recovery by the injured claimant; 71 (2) seriousness of
the injuries indicating that a judgment would be rendered in
excess of the policy limits; 7 2 (3)

non-disclosure of relevant

facts to the insured (i.e., settlement offers);73 and (4) sacrifice
by insurer of a sizable amount of the insured's money to salvage
a small amount of its own. 74 In refusing to find the insurers

liable, Louisiana courts have predicated their decisions on such
66. "The insured must be held to good faith and intelligent action."
Davis v. Maryland Cas. Co., 16 La. App. 253, 259, 133 So. 769, 771 (2d Cir.
1931).
67. Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154 (5th
Cir. 1965); Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 250 La. 105,
194 So.2d 713 (1967); Trahan v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 187 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969); Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.2d 672
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). Cf'. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co.,
185 So.2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966) (negligence is the basis of recovery).
68. Hernandez v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 346 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
1965).
69. Id. at 155 (trial judge's instructions approved on appeal).
70. Trahan v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969); Roberie v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 619 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1966).
71. See note 70 supra.
72. See note 70 supra.
73. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 619 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1966), aff'd, 250 La. 105, 194 So.2d 713 (1967); Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
74. Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).

1970]

COMMENTS

factors as (1) the existence of distinctly litigable issues as to
liability,7 5 (2) mere errors of judgment on the part of the
insurer,76 and (3) fault of the insured in rejection of the com77
promise.
Breach of the insurer's duty of good faith does not necessarily result in a finding of bad faith on the part of the insurer.
In Civil Code article 1934,78 bad faith-defined as a designed
breach of the contract from some motive of interest or ill willis distinguished from the mere breach of good faith in not
complying with the contract. Although not guilty of affirmative
"bad faith," the insurer may still be held liable for a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith. Such a breach, while
not equivalent to affirmative bad faith, is equivalent to a
"negligent breach of the covenant." This confusion has resulted
from application of the "good faith" test as distinguished from
the "due care" test.
Duty of Due Care
In an effort to require less exacting proof by the insured
of a breach of the duty to settle, some jurisdictions base the
insurer's duty upon a requirement of "due care," defined as a
79
negligent rejection of a compromise offer resulting in liability.

75. Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1965); Stewart v. Wood, 153 So.2d 497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963).
76. Stewart v. Wood, 153 So.2d 497 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). In his
dissent to Trahan v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 187, 194 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969), Judge Tate advocates non-liability for the insurer due to
the reasonable possibility of non-coverage under the policy.
77. Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.2d 672 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1965).
78. LA. CxV. CODS art. 1934: "Where the object of the contract is anything but the payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its
breach are the amount of loss he has sustained, and the profit of which
he has been deprived, under the following exceptions and modifications:
"(1) When the debtor has been guilty of no fraud or bad faith, he is
liable only for such damages as were contemplated, or may reasonably be
supposed to have entered into the contemplation of the parties at the time
of the contract. By bad faith in this and the next rule, is not meant the
mere breach of faith in not complying with the contract, but a designed
breach of it from some motive of interest or ill will.
"(2) When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or
bad faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such damages as were, or
might have been foreseen at the time of making the contract, but also to
such as are the immediate and direct consequence of the breach of that
contract; but even when there is fraud, the damages cannot exceed this."
79. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1967); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rice, 370 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1966); Seguros
Tepeyac, S.A. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965); Fidelity & Cas.
Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1959); Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F.
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The liability of an insurer for negligence is based upon the
duty of the insurer to perform the settlement proceedings with
reasonable care and skill.80 The degree of care required under
a "negligence test" of liability has ordinarily been phrased as
"that which an ordinary prudent person would exercise in the
conduct of his own affairs." 81 Many of the factors indicating
''negligence" on the part of the insurer are identical to those
required to prove a breach of an insurer's duty of good faith:
likelihood of recovery by the injured claimant, 82 possibility of
recovering damages in excess of the policy limits, s failure to
investigate the facts,8 4 insurer's rejection of the advice of its
own attorney or agent,85 and rejection of a compromise offer
after judgment has been rendered. 6
In Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,87 the

Louisiana First Circuit, while finding that the insurer had not
acted in bad faith, held it liable for negligent failure under the
contract to communicate an offer of compromise to the insured.
Not finding the insurer in bad faith for failure to compromise
the claim within the policy limits, 8 8 the court held the insurer

liable as negligent for lack of proper attention in protecting
the rights of the insured89 and for not discharging a duty
imposed by the contract of insurance.90 The insurer on appeal
argued that there was no precedent for finding insurer liability
on negligence grounds.9 1 Seemingly rejecting liability for negligent action by the insurer, the supreme court held that the
Supp. 661 (E.D. Texas 1968); Dalrymple v. Alabama Farm Bur. Mut. Ins.
Co., 103 So.2d 711 (Ala. 1958).
80. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & P. G. Ins. Co.,
240 F. 573 (lst Cir. 1917).
81. See note 79 supra.
82. Ballard v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Co., 86 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1936);
G. A. Stowers Furn. Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1929).
83. See note 82 supra.
84. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Wyoming Valley Paper Co., 84 F.2d 633 (let
Cir. 1936); Martin v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 178,
39 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1964).
85. Attleboro Mfg. Co. v. Frankfort Marine, Accident & P. G. Ins. Co.,
240 F. 573 (1st Cir. 1917); Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.
Texas 1968).
86. Foundation Res. Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 388 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1968);
Hazelrigg v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 228 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1955).
87. 185 So.2d 619 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
88. Id. at 622, 623.
89. Id. at 625.
90. Id. at 626.
91. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 250 La. 105, 112,
194 So.2d 713, 715 (1967).
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insurer was more than negligent, and that by ignoring the
insured it had acted in utter disregard of the insured's desire
to protect himself from financial loss.9 2 In Trahan v. Central

Mut. Ins. Co., 3 however, the Third Circuit found the insurer
liable to the insured for failure to act "in the most reasonable
manner under the circumstances.

' 94

(Emphasis added.)

Con-

fusion seemingly exists, therefore, in contemporary Louisiana
jurisprudence as to whether the duty owed by the insurer is
one of "good faith" or "due care."9 15
An Immediate Solution
Obviously the distinction between good faith and negligence
is somewhat nebulous and superficial; 9 moreover, some courts
use the two terms interchangeably.9 7 No reason for this difficult
distinction between "good faith" and "negligence" need exist
under Louisiana law by virtue of the Civil Code articles governing mandate.9 8 Once the insurance contract has been char92. Id. at 115, 194 So.2d at 716.
93. 219 So.2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). See also Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965).
94. Trahan v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So. 187, 194 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1969).
95. In Younger v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 174 So.2d 672, 675 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1965), Judge Tate quotes from Appleman: "The conclusion
must be drawn that mere termininology means little. It is rather the factual
situation which is significant in light of the duty which exists." See 7A
J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4712, at 578 (1962).
96. St. Paul-Mercury Indem. Co. v. Martin, 190 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.
1951); Jessen v. O'Danlel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962). See also Keeton,
Liability Insurance and Responsibility for Settlement, 67 HARv. L. REv.
1147 (1954); Comment, 16 OKCLA. L. REV. 110 (1963); Note, 40 N.D. L. REv. 80
(1964).
97. "Some courts, in weighing the responsibility of the liability insurer,
speak of bad faith; some speak of negligence; others use the two interchangeably. And, in truth, they are to some extent Interchangeable. The
insurer, as a professional defender of lawsuits, is held to a standard
higher than that of an unskilled practitioner. What might be Ignorance
in his instance may be unforgivable oversight of the insurer; what might
be neglect in his instance would well constitute bad faith on the part of
the insurer. The question is always: 'Did the Insurer exercise that degree
of skill, judgment, and consideration for the welfare of the insured
which it, as a skilled professional defender of lawsuits having sole charge
of the investigation, settlement and trial of the suit may have been
expected to utilize?' If it did, there is no problem; it is not liable. If
it did not, then a court could easily describe its conduct as being negligent,
or as not in accordance with the high duty of good faith which it owed
to its insured." 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4712 at 562 (1962).
98. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2985-3034. One writer suggested that Louisiana's
problem with the liability of an insurer for an excess judgment would be
solved by the Direct Action Statute (LA. R.S. 22:655 (1950)), giving the
injured party the right to sue on the contract of liability insurance;
thus, when the injured party elects to sue the insurer alone, there can be
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acterized as a special mandate, the insurer as mandatary becomes bound "to do whatever may appear conducive to the
interest of the principal." 0 The sanction for departure from the
assumed duty is provided in article 3003: "The attorney is
responsible, not only for unfaithfulness in his management,
but also for his fault or neglect."'00 (Emphasis added.) Being
responsible for his fault, neglect and unfaithfulness to the
principal, Louisiana's solution to the distinction between good
faith and negligence would be solved since a mandatary may
be held fully responsible to his principal for either his bad
faith'01 or his negligence.
Therefore, by applying Louisiana's articles on mandate, the
duty of the insurer to settle becomes contractual, and he is
responsible for a breach of the duty resulting from either his
fault or neglect.
no excess judgment to be awarded against the insured. Comment, 9 LOYOLA
L. Rsv. 98 (1958). Practically speaking, however, the problem of the insurer's
liability for an excess judgment Is still present in Louisiana litigation.
99. LA. Cxv. CODE art. 2995.
100. Id. art. 3003. Inherently, in the insurer-insured relationship a conflict of interests exists. Thus, the mandatary of the insured may upon
the proposal of a compromise within the policy limits have interests which
conflict with those of the principal (insured). By analogizing the mandate
to a contract relative to labor, which mandate is (2 PLANIOL, CivIL LAW
TREATISE no. 2233 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959)), it may be assumed that
the mandatary has agreed to perform the services and thus consider first
the interests of the principal. Planiol does not discuss in his treatise the
effect of conflicting interests of the mandatary and the responsibility of
the agent in such a situation.
Louisiana jurisprudence had repeatedly enunciated the principle that
a mandatary cannot lawfully serve or acquire any private interest in
opposition to the principal's. Neal v. Daniels, 217 La. 679, 47 So.2d 44 (1950);
Robinson v. Commercial Cattle Co., 82 So.2d 108 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955).
Despite the fact that the mandatary may not lawfully serve interests in
opposition to the principal's, no rule forbids a mandatary with inherently
conflicting Interests from becoming an agent. However, once he does
contract to assume the position of mandatary, he must serve the interests
of the principal faithfully. "It to the duty of an agent to fully inform
the principal of all facts relating to the subject matter of the agency which
come to the knowledge of the agent and which it is material for the
principal to know for the protection of his interests." Dauzat v. Simmesport State Bank, 167 So.2d 681, 685 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964). So, solution to
the problem of the Insurer's duty to settle offered by the mandate articles
would be in accord with those cases holding the insurer's duty to be that
of considering the interests of the insured above that of Its own.
101. LA. CIv. CooE art. 3556(13): "Fault-There are In law three degrees
of faults: the gross, the slight, and the very slight.
"The gross fault is that which proceeds from inexcusable negligence
or ignorance; it Is considered as nearly equal to fraud.
"The slight fault is that want of care which a prudent man usually
takes of his business.
"The very slight fault Is that which is excusable, and for which no
responsibility is incurred."
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A Long-Term Solution-Strict Liability
The contention that the terms of the liability policies giving
control of the settlement of claims to the insurer impliedly
obligates it to accept any compromise offer within the policy
limits at the risk of being held absolutely liable for any excess
judgment has met with little success.10 2 Recently, however, in
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 0 3 the California Supreme Court
suggested that in future cases it might adopt a rule of strict
liability: "[Clontract duties are strictly enforced and not subject to a standard of reasonableness.' ' 0 4 In addition, the court
added that a strict liability rule would dispense with the determination of whether the refusal to settle was made in good faith.
Since only the insurer might benefit from a refusal to compromise within the policy limits, it should bear the resulting
loss.

l0 5

Increasingly, legal writers advocate the adoption of a theory
of strict liability because of its possible advantages. 00 The
adoption of strict liability with its degree of certainty and
clarity' 7 facilitates application and avoids the inherent practical problems of present standards. 08 Under present jurisprudence the various factors considered by the courts in determining if an insurer has breached his duty of good faith or due
care serve as the only guideline to an insurer who is faced
with the problem of whether to compromise or not. No general articulation of a duty to "act as a reasonable man" or its
equivalent can be ascertained from the decisions holding the
insurer liable for a breach of its duty of good faith. If litigation is necessary, the problem under strict liability would be
predominantly a question of law-the jury's only role would
102. Noshey v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 68 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1934);
Georgia Cas. Co. v. Cotton Mills Prod. Co, 159 Miss. 396, 132 So. 73 (1931).
103. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967); Notes, 13 U. Cm. L. REV. 105 (1945); 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 199 (1968),
18 STAN. L. REV. 475 (1966); 60 YALE L.J. 1037 (1951); Comment, 47 NEB. L.
REv. 705 (1928).
104. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 177,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967). The Crisci case has been noted In: Notes, 17
CATH. U. L. REV. 125 (1967), 28 MD. L. REV. 166 (1968), 29 MONTANA L. REV.
90 (1967), 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 228 (1968), 46 TEX. L. REV. 113 (1967).
105. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967).
106. Notes, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 535 (1956), 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199 (1968),
60 YALE L.J. 1037 (1951); Comments, 47 NEB. L. REV. 705 (1968), 43 WAsH. L.
REV. 799 (1968).
107. Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199 (1968).
108. Comment, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 188 (1967).
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be to determine if there had been a non-collusive offer of settlement. 1' The only requirement for recovery would be an offer
of settlement within the policy limits,110 and damages would
be limited to the excess since the refusal would not be a tortious
act but simply a waiver of the insurance company's limited
liability.""
Practically speaking, a strict liability rule would put pressure on the insurer to settle" 2 and would remove the unavoidable invitation to gamble with the insured's money. 1 3 Reduction of litigation between the insured and insurer would
eliminate the necessity of a second jury trial 1 4 and would relieve
the congested court calendars. 1 5 The two main purposes of
insurance-protection of the insured from sudden losses and
compensation to the injured-would both be furthered by holding an insurance company strictly liable for the excess judgment." 6 Adoption of the strict liability rule will not be substantially more expensive than the present standards" 7 and the
insurance company can distribute the loss from the few to
the many. 1
109. Comment, 47 NEB. L. REV. 705 (1968). Elimination of the unenlightened jury question has been advocated by legal writers for some
time; insurers object strenuously to the jury as they say that the jury
favors as insured in a suit for recovery of an excess judgment.
110. For without an offer no liability attaches. Comment, 47 NEB. L.
REv. 705 (1968).
111. Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199 (1968).
112. Id.
113. Comment, 43 WASH. r. REV. 799 (1968). Safeguards could be Incorporated to avoid abuse: (1) the offer should not be valid for purpose of
attaching strict liability until at least a certain stage of the proceedings,
(2) assurance that offers remain open for a sufficient time to allow their
evaluation, and (3) plaintiff must be allowed to reach amount of excess
liability In the hands of the insurer.
114. Id.
115. Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REv. 199 (1968). Furthermore, the theory of
strict liability in application would decrease the time and cost of handling
claims.
116.
117.
118.

Comment, 47 NEB. L. REV. 705 (1968).
Comment, 18 STAN. L. REV. 475 (1966).
Comment, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 188 (1967).
Comments, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 188 (1967),

47 NEB. L. REV.

705 (1968); Note, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 199 (1968).
At present under a standard $50,000 liability Insurance policy a single
male over twenty-one (one of the highest insurance rates) pays approximately $307 yearly. Under a $100,000 liability policy, the same person pays
$328 a year-a difference of $21. In effect, If a strict liability rule were
imposed an insured would be purchasing, for example, a $50,000 policy
with $100,000 coverage 4f an excess judgment were awarded after a compromise offer within policy the policy limits. Thus, the insured would be
paying a premium equivalent to that under a $100,000 policy, for example,
minus an amount attributable to the reduced risk-as the extended coverage
would only be necessary if an excess judgment were rendered after a refusal
to compromise.
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There are, however, arguments against the adoption of
a rule of strict liability. Liability policies impose only a limited
duty in the matter of settlement making it difficult to read
a rule of strict liability into the contractual language. 11 Increased costs attributed to the application of a rule of absolute
liability would place an additional burden on individuals who
purchase adequate coverage. Furthermore, it is argued that to
force an insurer to provide protection to an insured for which
no adequate premium has been paid 1 20 is to place an inequitable
burden on insurance companies and those policyholders who
buy sufficient insurance. Another argument is that fear of
excessive financial responsibility would induce insurers to accept
nuisance claims and settlement offers which they currently
reject.
No jurisdiction has yet held the insurer strictly liable to
the insured for refusal to compromise a claim within the policy
limits. Yet, the dictum pronouncement of the California court
in the Crisci'2 ' case indicates that at least one jurisdiction may
be willing to apply a rule of absolute liability in future cases.
Legal writers have advocated adoption of such a rule for many
years. In an area of law previously imposing no duty of the
insurer to settle whatsoever, the trend has been to impose
more exacting requirements upon the insurer in its consideration of compromise offers within the policy limits.
Amount of Recovery
When an insurer acts negligently or in bad faith in failing
to settle within the policy limits and an excess judgment results,
it may be held liable for the amount required by the insured
to pay the remainder of the judgment. 22 Although earlier jurisprudence refused to allow recovery by the insured until he
had satisfied the judgment,' 28 later cases allow recovery whether
119. Other adverse considerations when considering adoption of a
theory of strict liability are the fact that the change should be effected
by the legislature to give the theory support not found in the contractual
language and that the balance of negotiating power between the insurer
and insured is upset. Comment, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 188 (1967).
120. Comment, 6 AM. Bus. L.J. 469 (1968). This argument is not tenable
in view of the fact that the insured will be required to pay additional
premiums. See note 118 supra.
121. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 13 (1967).
122. See notes 49, 79 supra.
123. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. York, 104 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1939);
Dumas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 92 N.H. 140, 26 A.2d 361 (1942).
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or not the judgment has been paid. 12 4 To determine the date
on which prescription begins to run, many courts have held
that the applicable limitations period begins on the date of
the judgment against the insured. 125 Thus, jurisdictions not
requiring prepayment of the excess judgment as a prerequisite
to a suit against the insurer reasoned that since the insured's
cause of action arises on entry of the judgment against him,
the incurrence-not satisfaction-of the liability is the legal
injury sustained by the insured. 126 The result reached by the
later cases has a sound practical significance. The insured should
not be required to suffer impairment of credit for the benefit
of the insurance company. 127 Moreover, an insolvent insured
may never be able to press his claim against the insurer, thus
depriving the injured claimant of the total amount of damages
awarded to him by the court.
Early cases did not allow recovery for consequential damages,' 28 punitive damages, 129 or attorney's fees. 1 0 Later jurisprudence affords the insured the right to recover attorney's
fees,"'1 and in some cases consequential damages. 1 2 Where an
insured's business was sold on execution because the insurer
did not supply a supersedeas bond to protect the insured pending appeal, damages were recovered." 33 Special damages were
124. Andrews

v.

Commercial

Union

Ins. Co.,

891 F.2d 935

(4th

Cir.

1968); Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1961); Jessen
v. O'Daniel, 210 F. Supp. 317 (D. Mont. 1962); Sweeten v. National Mut.
Ins. Co., 233 Md. 52, 194 A.2d 817 (1963). Cf. Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281
F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Texas 1968). See Notes, 12 ALA. L.
ARK. L. REv. 138, 41 VA. L. REV. 666 (1955).

R v. 411 (1960),

10

125. See note 124 supra.
126. See note 124 supra.

127. Southern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, 250 S.W.2d
785 (1952).
128. Christian v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 888 (N.D.
Cal. 1950); Blue Bird Taxi Corp. v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 26 F.

Supp.

808 (E.D. S.C. 1938); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d
750 (1950).
129. Herman v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 271 F. Supp. 502 (E.D. Mo.
1967); Linkenhoger v. American Fid. & Cas. Co., 152 Tex. 534, 260 S.W.2d 884

(1953).
130. Christian v.

Preferred Accident

Ins. Co., 89 F.

Supp. 888

(N.D.

Cal. 1950); Zumwalt v. Utilities Ins. Co., 360 Mo. 362, 228 S.W.2d 750 (1950).
131. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, 412 F.2d 475 (5th Cir. 1969);
American Fid. & Cas. Co. v. Greyhound Corp, 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958);

American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Davis, 146 So.2d 615 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1962).
132. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.
1967); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.

13 (1967).
133. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 313 P.2d 404 (1957).
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awarded where the insured could not sell his house because of
a judgment lien on it which resulted in its loss and credit destruction. 3 4 A substantial award was made for mtntal suffering
accompanied by a decline in physical health, hysteria, and a
suicide attempt, due to a change in financial condition. 3 5
In Louisiana, if an insurer is liable for a breach of the duty
to settle, the insured may recover the amount of judgment in
excess of the policy limits, plus interest from the date of judicial
demand and all costs.18 6 Furthermore, Louisiana does not 'require payment by the insured of the excess judgment as a prerequisite to a suit again the insurer. 187 However, Louisiana courts
have never allowed recovery of attorney's fees in the absence
of bad faith. 138
If as suggested Louisiana bases the insurer's duty on the
mandatory relationship, 18 9 recovery of damages would be governed by Civil Code article 1934140 because the articles in the
chapter on mandate provide no basis for determining the amount
of damages allowable. In the absence of bad faith, the court is
to award those damages contemplated by the parties at the
time of the making of the contract, 1 1 which would be the
amount recoverable against the insured in excess of the policy
limits. If the insurer is guilty of bad faith,'142 it will be liable
134. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Smoot, 381 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1967).
135. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr.
13 (1967).
136. Roberie v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 250 La. 105, 194
So.2d 713 (1967); Trahan v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 187 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969); Richard v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 212 So.2d 471
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1968); Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1964).
137. Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 166 So.2d 747 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1964).
138. Trahan v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 219 So.2d 187 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1969); Roberie v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 185 So.2d 619 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1966); Smallpage v. Wagner & Wagner, 84 So.2d 863 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1956).
139. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3003.
140. See note 80 supra.
141. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(1): "When the debtor has been guilty of no
fraud or bad faith, he is liable only for such damages as were contemplated,
or may reasonably be supposed to have entered into the contemplation of
the parties at the time of the contract ....
142. Id.: "[B]y bad faith Is not meant the mere breach of faith in not
complying with the contract but a designed breach of it from some motive
of interest or ill will."
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to the insured for consequential damages resulting from the
144
breach 143 in addition to the amount in excess of the policy.
If the strict liability theory were adopted, damages would
be limited to the amount of the excess recovered above the
policy limits. There would be no administrative costs. Since the
refusal to settle would be treated simply as a waiver of the
insurance company's limited liability,'1 45 there would be no
recovery for consequential damages.
Assignment and Seizure of Insured's Right of
Action Against Insurer
The vast majority of jurisdictions do not allow the injured
party a direct cause of action against the insurer for a wrongful
refusal to settle 14 unless there is a provision in the policy
allowing a claimant the right to recover directly from the
insurer on the same cause of action that the insured would
have been entitled to. 141 Some jurisdictions allow the insured
to validly assign his claim to the injured party on the basis
of assignability of a contractual cause of action; 148 other juris143. Id. art. 1934(2): "When the inexecution of the contract has proceeded from fraud or bad faith, the debtor shall not only be liable to such
damages as were, or might have been foreseen at the time of making
the contract, but also to such as are the immediate and direct consequence
of the breach of that contract ... "
144. Louisiana courts have been applying article 1934 to determine
recovery due to the fact that the duty has been determined one of an
implied covenant of "good faith," and thus contractual.
145. See note 114 supra.
146. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A. v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1965);
Canal Ins. Co. v. Sturgis, 114 So.2d 469 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1959); Francis v.
Newton, 75 Ga. App. 341, 45 S.E.2d 282 (1947). There are cases which allow
the insured a direct right of action against the insurer on the theory that
the insured is the third party beneficiary of the contract of insurance.
Davis v. National Grange Ins. Co., 281 F. Supp. 998 (E.D. Va. 1968); Atlantic
City of American Cas. Ins. Co., 254 F. Supp. 396 (D. N.J. 1966). But of.
Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661 (E.D. Texas 1968).
Usually, jurisdictions do not allow the judgment creditor to recover
from the insurer directly. Steen v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 401 P.2d 254
(Colo. 1965); Powell v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 88 Ill. App.2d 343, 232 N.E.2d
155 (1967); Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 381 S.W.2d 914 (Tenn. 1964).
See Notes, 14 U. FLA. L. REV. 48 (1961), 40 N.D. L. REV. 80 (1964); Comments, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 557 (1963), 16 OKLA. L. REV. 110 (1963), 38 TEx.
L. REV. 233 (1959).
147. Automobile Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 134 Fla. 815, 821, 184 So. 852,
855 (1938): "If ... an execution on a judgment against Assured is returned
unsatisfied, the judgment creditor shall have a right of action against the
Company to recover the amount of said judgment to the same extent that
Assured would have had if he had paid the judgment." See Comment, 17
U. MIAMI L. REV. 557 (1963).
148. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198
(1958); Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966);
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dictions refuse to allow assignment of an action considered ex
delicto. 149 In most jurisdictions allowing assignment of an
insured's right of action against an insurer, the assignment
usually occurs after judgment has been obtained. However, at
least one jurisdiction permits assignment of the insured's claim
before judgment is rendered, 150 the assignment operating as an
equitable assignment or a contract to assign.
The main policy reason against assignability is the encouragement of fraud and collusion between the insured and the
injured claimant.' 5' Such an argument is probably unwarranted
in that such collusion will not be necessarily increased by assignment. If an insured's liability terminated, collusions would be
perhaps even more remote, since the insured no longer has a
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the litigation. Primarily,
assignment would streamline the needlessly complicated and
unjust procedures so that the injured could sue the insurer
directly. Assignment also gives the insured a remedy without
fearing being forced into bankruptcy before he can collect the
152
excess.
In accord with the majority of jurisdictions, Louisiana has
not yet allowed an injured party to sue the insurer directly for
a wrongful refusal to settle. Although some jurisdictions allow
injured parties to directly sue the insurer as a third party beneficiary of the contract of insurance, 153 Louisiana in interpretation of its "direct action" statute 54 making all injured persons
Nichols v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 37
(1967). See Note, 72 HARV. L. REv. 568 (1959).
149. Dillingham v. Tri-State Ins. Co., 214
(1964); Carne v. Maryland Cas. Co., 208 Tenn.
"It is only in comparatively recent times that

Wis.2d 238, 155 N.W.2d 104
Tenn. 592, 381 S.W.2d 914
403, 346 S.W.2d 259 (1961).
claims of this latter kind

[claims to unliquidated damages] have been regarded as assignable, and
then only with respect to claims for injuries to property rather than to
person. A claim to unliquidated damages for tortious injury to person or
reputation is still nonassignable, although the distinguishing line may
sometimes be hard to recognize. . . ." A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 857 (1952).
However, there are cases allowing assignment of a claim whether it
be a contract right of action or a delictual one: Smith v. Transit Cas. Co.,
281 F. Supp. (E.D. Texas 1968); Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
50 Cal.2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal.
App.2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1957).
150. Critz v. Farmers Ins. Group, 230 Cal. App.2d 788, 41 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1964).
151. Comment, 18 STAN. L. REv. 475 (1966).
152. Gray v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 422 Pa. 500, 223 A.2d 8 (1966).
153. See note 146 supra.
154. LA. R.S. 22:655 (1962): "It is also the intent of this Section that
all liability policies within their terms and limits are executed for the
benefit of all injured persons, his or her survivors or heirs to whom the
Insured is liable. ..
"
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beneficiaries of the policy has held that the state does not make
the liability insurance contract one containing a stipulation
pour autrui. 15 5 Such a decision seems sound as the injured party
is only a third party beneficiary1 56 by statute as regards the
insurance proceeds and not a beneficiary of the contractual
1 57
duty owed the insured by the insurer to settle claims.
In Louisiana assignability in this area has not been
thoroughly examined by the courts. In Wooten v. Central
1s
Mut. Ins. Co.,
5 the court affirmed the right of either the trustee
of the insured or the trustee's assignee to enforce an insured's
cause of action. However, in Younger v. Lumbermen's Mutual
Insurance Company, 50 a direct assignee of the insured pressed
the claim, but the court passed on the merits of the action without considering the assignability of the insured's cause of action.
Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that either a trustee of the
insured or the trustee's assignee may enforce the insured's
claim; yet, the right of an insured to validly assign this claim
directly has not been definitely determined.
In view of the fact that the Civil Code recognizes assignment of litigious rights' 60 and that there is no prohibition against
assignment of a contractual right of action, validity of a direct
assignment can logically be upheld under Louisiana law. By
adoption of the mandate articles as a basis for the relationship
created between the insurer and insured, there would be finality
in determining the nature of the action as one in contract and,
therefore, assignable.
Generally speaking, under Louisiana law the property of
the debtor is the common pledge of his creditors. 16' In context
the property of a debtor, the insured, may be seized by his creditor, the injured party, after a judgment has been rendered for
155. Dumas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 125 So.2d 12 (La. App.

3d Cir. 1960).
156. LA. CIV. CODs art. 1890: "A person may also, in his own name,
make some advantage for a third person the condition or consideration
of a commutative contract, or onerous donation, and if such third person

consents to avail himself of the advantage stipulated in his favor, the
contract can not be revoked."
157. Not as regards the duty to settle Is he a third party beneficiary
because he is not adversely affected by a refusal to compromise.

158. Wooten v. Central Mut. Ins. Co., 202 So.2d 690 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
159. 174 So.2d 672 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965)

(defendant's

exception of no

cause of action sustained because actions of the insurer were not arbitrary
or capricious.)

160. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2652, 2653, 3556(18).
161. Id.

arts. 1968, 3183.
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the injured party. Upon entry of judgment against the insured
in excess of the policy limits, a cause of action arises in favor
of the insured against the insurer. 10 2 It is necessary to determine whether the injured party as creditor of the insurer can
seize his cause of action against the insurer. Is the cause of action
property of the debtor?
If one proceeds from the general premise that all nonexempt property of the debtor may be seized, 0 3 be it corporeal
or incorporeal, 64 then the incorporeal right of action against
the insurer by the insured debtor, may be seized by the injured
party creditor, as the right of action is not exempt from
seizure. 65 Furthermore, the courts have stated that statutes
exempting property from seizure are in derogation of the common right and will be strictly interpreted so as not to extend
to objects not expressly designated in law.166 Under French law
contractual causes of action were considered property and capable of being seized: "Contractual causes of action for the recovery of money ... are generally regarded in France as patri1
monial assets susceptible of seizure by creditors. OT
In Louisiana, some decisions indicate that claims deriving from contractual obligations cannot be seized by creditors prior to institution of suit by the debtor. 68 However, in In re Bonvillain'69
a life insurance policy of the debtor was seized by a creditor;
and since the policy is essentially a contract right, it seems thatthe court permitted what in other cases it has forbidden. Logically, reasoning from the general premise that the property of
the debtor is subject to seizure by his creditor unless the property is exempt, contractual causes of action should be subject
to seizure by a creditor.
162.
163.
164.
A lease

See note 127 supra.
2 PLANIOL, Civu LAW TREATISE no. 180 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
McLemore v. Abell, 12 La. App. 147, 125 So. 601 (2d Cir. 1929).
(incorporeal) was subject to seizure and sale by lessee's judgment

creditors.

165. LA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; LA. R.S. 13.3881 (1950). See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL
LAW TREATISE no. 184 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).
166. A. Wilbert's Sons Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Ricard, 167 La. 416, 119
So. 411 (1929); Todd v. Gordy, 28 La. Ann. 666 (1876); Guillory v. Deville,
21 La. Ann. 686 (1869); Pelican State Associates, Inc. v. Winder, 208 So.2d
355 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
167. 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 78 (1966).
168. National Park Bank v. Concordia Land & Timber Co., 159 La. 86,
105 So. 234 (1925); Peet v. McDaniel, 27 La. Ann. 455 (1875); Leefe v.
Walker, 18 La. 1 (1841). See LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2295.
169. In re Bonvillain, 232 F.2d 370 (E.D. La. 1916). The court treated the
life insurance policy as property.
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If the lawsuit against the insurer has been filed by the insured, the injured party as creditor has a right to seize the
interest and right of the litigant who is his debtor. 170 However,
the seizing creditor may not interfere with the progress of the
suit or acquire control over the litigation.' 7' Then if judgment
be awarded in favor of the debtor, the litigant must pay the
seizing creditor the amount of his claim against the debtor
covered by the judgment. 172 More important, if the debtor has
neglected to prosecute his cause of action after his rights have
been seized in a pending lawsuit, after failure of the debtor to
show cause, he may sell the rights and interests of the debtor. 78
The only limitation placed on the right of the creditor to seize
the rights of a debtor in a pending lawsuit is that the creditor
4
may not seize those actions personal to the debtor.1
Conclusion
In light of an increasing concern as to the inequality of
bargaining power between the insured and insurer, the courts
have progressed from decisions holding that the insurer has no
duty to the insured to settle, to those imposing either a limited
duty of good faith or due care upon the insurer. Thus, the trend
has been to demand from the insurer more consideration with
regard to protection of the insured's interest in rejecting a compromise offer. If there is adoption by the jurisdictions of a strict
liability rule-which is still speculative-an insurer who was
once under no duty to the insured regarding settlement will be
absolutely liable if he refuses to settle resulting in a judgment
in excess of the policy limits. But, presently courts are struggling with application of either a "good faith" or "due care"
standard with respect to the insurer's actions. What constitutes
"good faith" or "due care" may only be surmised from the
factors enumerated in the decisions.
By analogizing the relationship of the insurer and insured
to a relationship of mandatary and principal, Louisiana could
immediately solve many of the perplexing problems-such as
170. LA. R.S. 13:3864 (1950); Miller v. Housing Auth. of N.O., 200 So.2d
704 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).

171. See note 170 supra.
172. LA. R.S. 13:3866 (1950).
173. Id.
174. McConnell v. Webb, 226 La. 385, 76 So.2d 405 (1954); Collector of
Revenue v. Tenneco Oil Co., 206 So.2d 302 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968). See
1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA PRACTICR § 78 (1966).
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the nature of the duty, amount of damages recoverable, assignability and seizure of the insured's cause of action. Ideally, law
should be administered in a predictable manner providing certainty and stability. Louisiana courts need not become enmeshed in meaningless distinctions and nebulous standards when
the Civil Code clearly provides a legal remedy for the insured
who is adversely affected by an insurer's refusal to compromise
a claim.
Katherine L. Shaw
HEARSAY, THE CONFRONTATION GUARANTEE
AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The hearsay rule excludes out of court assertions offered
to prove the matter asserted' because they are not made under
2
oath and their veracity cannot be tested by cross examination.
Of course, there are many exceptions to the rule based on the
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and necessity. 8
The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to confront

the witnesses against him. . . . Presumably, the ratification
of the sixth amendment in 1789 did not crystallize into immutable form the rules concerning admission of hearsay in criminal
"

1. The definition used is essentially that found in Comment, Hearsay
and Non-Hearsay as Reflected in Louisiana Criminal Cases, 14 LA. L. Rsv.
611 (1954). Wigmore does not attempt to define hearsay in his treatise on
evidence. 5 J. WIGMORE, EV[DENCE §§ 1360-1366 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited WOMORE]. McCormick offers a slightly different definition from the
one used in this Comment. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954) [hereinafter
cited MCCORMICK], but warns that not too much should be expected from
any definition. The word "assertion" is used instead of statement to emphasize that hearsay may be non verbal. McCoRMiCK § 229.
2. As McCormick points out, the absence of an oath and lack of
opportunity to cross examine are frequently mentioned together as justifications for the hearsay rule. MCCORMICK § 224 n.5. A third reason, perhaps
implicit in the first two, frequently given Is that the trier of fact has no
chance to observe the demeanor of the declarant if hearsay evidence is
used. Generally it is agreed that the absence of an opportunity to cross
examine the declarant is the principle justification for the rule against
hearsay. MCCORMICK § 2241; WIMORE § 1365; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and
the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L. REv. 177 (1948).
For an examination of spurious reasons sometimes advanced to justify
the rule, see WIGMORE § 1363.
3. MCCORMICK §§ 230-299; WIGMORE §§ 1420-1684.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. With the exception of Idaho every state constitution has a similar provision. WIGMORE § 1397 n.1.

